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JULIE M. DIETRICK*
Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland: An Unnecessarily
Broad Rule That Could Adversely Affect
A Corporation's Shareholders
IN STORETRAX.COM, INC. V GURLAND,' THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS adopted
a rigid bright-line rule when it held that a director who sues the corporation of
which he is a board member and attaches the corporation's assets without notice
does not breach his fiduciary duty to that corporation.' The appellate court should
have instead followed well-established fiduciary principles governing conflicts of
interest which favor a fact-specific inquiry over a stringent standard? By adopting
such a bright-line rule, the Maryland Court of Appeals has unnecessarily expanded
a corporate director's power and created a situation where a corporate officer could
abuse his position on a board while suing the corporation, which could have unde-
sirable policy implications and adversely affect the corporation's shareholders.4
I. THE CASE
In 1997, Joshua A. Gurland founded Storetrax.com (hereinafter "Storetrax"), a cor-
poration which operates an internet-based commercial real estate listing service.' In
1999, Gurland entered into an agreement with a group of investors whereby they
acquired a majority interest in Storetrax's shares and Gurland remained a member
of the board and became president and chief executive officer of the corporation.6
The employment agreement provided for Gurland to serve successive, one-year
terms that were renewed automatically unless either party notified the other in
writing at least 90 days in advance of the agreement's expiration date.7 The corpo-
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2009; B.A., Journalism, University of
Maryland, College Park, May 2006.
1. 915 A.2d 991 (Md. 2007).
2. Id. at 1010.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 994.
6. Id. In January 2000, Gurland relinquished his CEO title, and one year later, he also surrendered the
title of president. Id. at 994 n. 1. Gurland then assumed the position of Senior Vice President of Technology and
Strategy until his employment was terminated in November 2001. Id. On December 5, 2002, Gurland resigned
from his position on the board of directors. Id.
7. Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 895 A.2d 355, 359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
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ration could also terminate the agreement at any time, with or without cause, upon
ten days written notice.' Upon termination, the corporation was to pay Gurland
twelve months salary as compensation.9
Gurland was fired on November 15, 2001."0 The parties disagreed as to whether
he was entitled to the severance payout in the contract." Gurland wrote a letter on
December 11, 2001 stating that he was entitled to his severance and while he hoped
the situation would be amicably resolved, he had consulted an attorney and would
proceed with a lawsuit if the issue was not resolved by December 21, 2001.12 Store-
trax responded with a letter on December 20, 2001, stating that (1) Gurland was
not entitled to severance;" (2) "there [was] still an opportunity to part on amicable
terms, provided that" he withdraws his demand for severance; and (3) that if Gur-
land pursued litigation, the Company would defend itself.'4 In January 2002, a
member of Storetrax's board attempted to end the dispute by offering a settlement,
which Gurland said he would consider.'" This was the last direct dialogue between
the parties.'6
On January 31, 2002, Gurland filed a complaint against Storetrax alleging breach
of contract and seeking $150,000 in severance pay.'7 The complaint was properly
delivered to Storetrax's resident agent in Maryland-the company's principal place
of business.'" Although the complaint was forwarded to the corporation's agent in
Delaware, where the company is incorporated, Storetrax never received notice of
the lawsuit and failed to timely respond to the complaint or Gurland's motion for
summary judgment.'9 During this same period of time, Gurland also visited the
corporation's Maryland headquarters several times as part of his employment with
the company, but never informed anyone there of the complaint.2" As a result of
8. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 995.
9. Id. The initial employment agreement set Gurland's salary at $125,000; however, in the summer of
2001, Gurland requested an increase in his salary to $150,000. Storetrax, 895 A.2d at 361. The corporation
granted this increase but claimed it only did so because the business was relocating and needed Gurland's
services. Id. After his salary was increased, Gurland requested that the agreement be amended to reflect the
change and it was then that the company informed him they did not think the agreement was valid. Id. at
361-62. In November 2001, Storetrax requested that all employees agree to a reduction in salary, which Gur-
land agreed to, bringing his salary to $135,000. Id. at 362.
10. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 995.
11. Id.
12. Id. Gurland further claimed that Storetrax had not yet given him the reason for his termination.
Storetrax, 895 A.2d at 362.
13. The Board took the position that Gurland was not entitled to severance because of his frequent
changes in job title, his downward adjustments in salary and his weak job performance. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at
995.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 995-96.
16. Id. at 996.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 895 A.2d 355, 364 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
20. Storetrax, 895 A.2d at 364.
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Storetrax's failure to respond, the Circuit Court granted Gurland's motion for sum-
mary judgment and entered a judgment against Storetrax in the amount of
$150,000. In an effort to enforce the judgment, Gurland petitioned for a writ of
garnishment attaching Storetrax's bank account, which was granted on March 19,
2002.22
The writ of attachment was the first time Storetrax received actual notice of the
lawsuit, after which the board wrote a letter to Gurland asking him to voluntarily
set aside the default judgment and withdraw the garnishment of the corporation's
bank account. 3 When Gurland refused, Storetrax then moved to set aside the sum-
mary judgment motion and quash the writ of attachment. 24 The trial court denied
both requests and Storetrax appealed." Storetrax then filed suit against Gurland
alleging that when he sued the corporation and attached its assets, he breached his
fiduciary duties to the corporation because he was a member of Storetrax's board
of directors. 26 The trial court found for Gurland, and Storetrax appealed this judg-
ment to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.27 The appellate court consolidated
the cases2" and affirmed in relevant part, holding that Gurland had not breached
his fiduciary duties.2 9 The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address
whether a member of the board of directors of a corporation breaches his fiduciary
duty when he sues the corporation in his capacity as an aggrieved former em-
ployee, obtains summary judgment by default, attaches the corporation's assets
without notice, and refuses to lift the judgment and garnishment.3"
21. Id.
22. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 996.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 996-97. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland,
No. 0561, September Term 2002, reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that it was an abuse of
the trial court's discretion to deny the corporation's motion. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 997. The night before the
new trial, Gurland moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that Storetrax had not terminated
him for cause and the motion was granted. Id. The case proceeded to trial on the breach of contract issue and a
jury returned a verdict in favor of Gurland for $150,000. Id. Storetrax appealed this judgment as well. Id.
26. Id. In particular, Storetrax argued that Gurland specifically knew Storetrax was insolvent when he filed
the lawsuit, never advised the corporation of his lawsuit despite visiting the corporation after its filing, con-
cealed existence of the lawsuit in order to obtain a default judgment, obtained summary judgment despite
knowing the corporation opposed his breach of contract claims, attached Storetrax's bank account, and op-
posed attempts to have the judgment and the garnishment set aside. Id.
27. See Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 895 A.2d 355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
28. Id. at 358.
29. Id. The Court of Special Appeals did find, however, that the trial court erroneously entered summary
judgment in favor of Gurland. Id. at 365-71. The appellate court also discussed Storetrax's argument that the
trial court erroneously applied principles of Maryland law, when it should have applied principles of Delaware
law. Id. at 371. However, the court noted that, as Storetrax conceded, the substantive law regarding breach of
fiduciary duty was the same in both Maryland and Delaware and thus any alleged error was harmless. Id. at
373. The court therefore continued to apply principles of Maryland law, when available. Id.
30. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 998.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland courts have outlined a set of broad, underlying fiduciary duty principles
applicable to all corporate officers, regardless of their position or interest in a cor-
poration. While Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland3" was a case of first impression in
Maryland, there are still well-settled principles of the general fiduciary duties that
govern corporate officers and directors, a director's ability to sue the corporation
he works for, and a director's right to pursue his claim against that corporation as a
creditor. 2
A. Maryland's Fiduciary Principles Emphasize That a Director Must Place The
Corporation's Interests Ahead of His Own
Maryland has long held that a director of a corporation bears an important fiduci-
ary relation to the corporation-one of trust and confidence that requires him to
act in the best interests of the corporation." In Cumberland Coal & Iron Co.,34 the
Maryland Court of Appeals first explained that the affairs of corporations should
be entrusted to the exclusive control of the directors and when they accept the
position, there is an inherent obligation that they will use their best efforts to pro-
mote the interests of the shareholders and will not place their own interests ahead
of those of the corporation. 5 The court further noted that if a director places him-
self in such a position, he cannot be acting both for himself and the corporation. 6
If he does so, the corporation is "deprived of the benefit of his judgment and super-
vision in regard to matters in which such judgment and supervision might be most
essential" to the corporation's interests and the other directors are placed in an
undesirable and potentially embarrassing situation.37 The policy behind this rule is
not only to ensure that corporate directors and officers operate in good faith, but
also to remove any temptation to do wrong." As a result, courts subject transac-
tions between parties operating under fiduciary duties to exact and rigid scrutiny.39
Six years later in Booth v. Robinson,40 the court again noted the important role of
the corporate director, and explained that because directors have such a wide
31. 915 A.2d 991.
32. See infra Part II.A.-D. The Maryland Court of Appeals applied Maryland law where it was available
under the theory that the law of both Maryland and Delaware was substantively the same regarding fiduciary
duty principles. Storetrax, 895 A.2d at 373. This note does not address whether this determination was correct.
33. See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (1875).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 605-06.
36. Id. at 606.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Once a claim is brought before the court, the party who is being accused of breaching his fiduciary
duty has the burden of proof in establishing that the transaction he entered into was fair and equitable. Id. at
605-06.
40. 55 Md. 419 (1881).
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breadth of power,4' they should be liable not only for fraud or negligence, but also
for any acts that are contrary to the good faith duty required of them.42
Since these early cases, the Maryland courts have continuously applied these
rules and expanded on what it means to be a director of a corporation. In Parish v.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n,43 the Maryland Court of Appeals ex-
plained that because of his fiduciary duties, a director must reveal all facts material
to the corporation's transactions and can be held liable when he conceals some-
thing.44 In Parish, members of a milk producing farm cooperative brought suit
against the cooperative and its directors alleging gross negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty when the directors sold the cooperative's assets for less than cost and
personally benefited from transactions involving the cooperative.4" In reversing the
trial court's dismissal of the action, the appellate court noted that directors do have
wide discretion in corporate operations and, in general, the court will not interfere
with the internal management of a business simply at the request of a stockholder
or member.46 However, the court explained that corporate directors can lose this
shield "if they permit the funds of the corporation or the corporate property to be
lost or wasted by their gross or culpable negligence," 7 which the court found was
sufficiently alleged in the complaint.4"
In 2000, the Maryland Court of Appeals expanded these principles further when
it decided Werbowsky v. Collomb,49 and ruled that the director's obligation to per-
form his duties in good faith runs to the corporation as a whole. In Werbowsky,
minority stockholders brought suit against corporate directors alleging breach of
fiduciary duty and gross negligence arising out of a transaction where the corpora-
tion purchased assets from the majority stockholder that exceeded their worth by
$150 million." In deciding the case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that as a check
on directors' broad managerial authority, they are required to perform their duties
in good faith and in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of
41. Id. at 436-37. Specifically, the court noted that corporate directors can make all necessary contracts,
sell or otherwise dispose of corporate property, and make any other judgments that are necessary for the best
interests of the corporation. Id.
42. id. at 437-38. "[Dlirectors are not liable for the consequences of unwise or indiscreet management, if
their conduct is entirely due to mere default or mistakes of judgment." Id. at 438. For additional discussion of
when corporate directors cannot be held liable for their actions taken on behalf of the corporation, see Coffman
v. Maryland Publ'g Co., 173 A. 248, 253-54 (Md. 1934) (rejecting stockholder's claim against a newspaper
corporation that the corporation was unprofitable and wasteful on the grounds that insolvency alone is not
enough to prove that a corporation's directors breached their duty of good faith).
43. 242 A.2d 512 (Md. 1968).
44. Id. at 540.
45. Id. at 520-37.
46. Id. at 540.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 541.
49. 766 A.2d 123 (Md. 2000).
50. Id. at 133 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 2-405.1 (1976, 1999 Repl. Vol.)).
51. Id. at 126-33.
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the corporation." The court noted that such a situation could not conceivably have
been in the corporation's best interests and therefore it was void." A few months
later, the Court of Appeals reiterated this in Leavy v. American Federal Savings
Bank 54-a case where a bank brought action against its corporate officer alleging he
breached his fiduciary duties in secretly taking a loan brokerage fee-and explained
that the policy behind the fiduciary duties is to keep corporate directors interests
aligned with the interests of the company and not working for their own personal
gain.55 By advocating such a high duty for directors, the court ensured that the
directors would be likely to go to great lengths to avoid the appearance of placing
their interests ahead of those of the corporation.
B. Maryland Law Governing Conflicts of Interest Has Evolved From a Bright-Line
Rule That Automatically Voids Interested Director Transactions to a
Fact-Specific Inquiry
The Maryland Court of Appeals has long held that where a person is a director of
and interested in two corporations, that person cannot make or participate in the
making of contracts between the two companies.56 Maryland also had a long-stand-
ing common law that any contract entered into by a corporation where one of the
directors had a substantial personal interest in the transaction is automatically void
or voidable because it is a conflict of interest. 7
This bright-line rule slowly began to evolve, however, and Maryland courts be-
gan to evaluate the facts of each transaction instead of automatically ruling it void.
The court explained in Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott" that where there is a
conflict with an interested board member, the transaction should not be automati-
cally void but instead should be subject to close scrutiny, with the burden on the
director accused of breaching his fiduciary duty.59 In Abbott, a stockholder sued
directors of the corporation for payments he alleged were made without the au-
thorization of the complete board or the stockholders.65 The court, in finding
against the directors, noted that the conflict of interest rule is designed to ensure
that directors operate in good faith and again explained that "exact and rigid scru-
tiny" is necessary to achieve this goal.6 The court clarified this need for a more
52. Id. at 133.
53. Id.
54. 764 A.2d 335 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
55. Id. at 372 (citing Levin v. Levin, 405 A.2d 770 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979)).
56. Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 430 (1881).
57. See Sullivan v. Easco Corp., 656 F. Supp. 531, 533 (D. Md. 1987) (discussing the common law gov-
erning conflict of interest transactions before 1979); see also Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 276 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2000) (citing Sullivan, 656 F. Supp. at 533).
58. 74 A.2d 17 (Md. 1950).
59. Id. at 20 (citing Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., 70 A. 95, 104 (Md. 1908)).
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 20 (citing Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 163 A. 480, 489 (Md. 1933)).
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circumstantial inquiry in Chesapeake Construction Corp v. Rodman,62 where it ac-
knowledged what the Abbott Court had noted-that transactions involving inter-
ested directors were historically automatically void-but said that the more
appropriate law was that such transactions be closely scrutinized and nullified only
if they are either unfair or entered into in bad faith.63 This ensures that those trans-
actions where there is some benefit despite the conflict of interest will not be lost to
the corporation. The Chesapeake court also explained that merely because a trans-
action appeared fair did not mean it was not subject to the close scrutiny previ-
ously held to be necessary.64
In 1976, the Maryland legislature formally adopted this view when it passed sec-
tion 2-419 of the Maryland Code, Corporations and Associations article, which
rejected the bright-line common-law rule and adopted a fact-specific rule that fo-
cuses on the circumstances surrounding each particular transaction." The Mary-
land Code provision indicates that an interest conflict is not automatically void
because it is not, in and of itself, a crime or injurious to the corporation and its
shareholders. 66 The provision recognizes that in many situations, the corporation
and its shareholders may secure benefits from a transaction even though one of the
directors involved in it was operating under a conflict of interest.67 Therefore, when
a director is operating under such a conflict, the transaction becomes subject to
close scrutiny to determine whether it benefits the corporation and the sharehold-
ers or solely the director." If the transaction benefits the director alone, then it will
still be held void.
62. 261 A.2d 156 (Md. 1970).
63. Id. at 158 (citing Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (1875)). In Chesapeake, the court
nullified a transaction where a corporation's officer sold most of the corporation's stock prior to his death
without the consent of the board or stockholders. Id.
64. Id.; see also Devereux v. Berger, 284 A.2d 605 (Md. 1971).
65. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-419(a)-(b) (West 2006). This provision is identical to the
rules that have been adopted by courts in Delaware, one of the centers of corporate litigation and legislation.
For an in-depth look at the Delaware law surrounding interested director transactions, see 1 DENNIS BLOCK ET
AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 267-71 (5th ed. 1998).
66. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2-419(a)-(b).
67. Id. Some interested director transactions are "not inherently detrimental to a corporation." BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 65, at 266. The law regulates interest conflict transactions because "experience shows that people
do often yield to the temptation to advance their self-interests and, if they do, other people may be injured.
That contingent fear is sufficient reason to warrant caution and to apply special standards and procedures" to
transactions where there is a conflict of interest. Id. Thus, the manner in which an interested director deals with
the conflict will ultimately determine whether the conflict is a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 266-67.
68. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-419(a)-(b). The purpose and effect of the provision is that the
interested director no longer bears the burden of proving the fairness and reasonableness of his conduct as long
as his interest was disclosed to the board of directors and a majority of the disinterested directors nonetheless
approved or remained silent. Id. § 2-419(a), (b)(l).
VOL. 4 NO. 1 2009
STORETRAX.COM, INC. V. GURLAND
The Maryland Code provisions also create a safe harbor for certain transac-
tions.69 In Shapiro v. Greenfield,7" the court explained that the safe harbor permits
an interested director to escape liability for breach of fiduciary duty if he informs
the shareholders or directors of his conflicting interests.7' The transaction will then
not be a breach of a corporate director's fiduciary duties because notice gives the
corporation and its remaining directors the opportunity to protect the corpora-
tion's interests.72 The court further noted that even if the director does not disclose
the interest, the transaction can still be saved if it is found to be fair and reasonable
to the corporation.73 Whether the transaction is found to be "fair and reasonable" is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the court.7"
C. Fiduciary Duty Principles Enable a Director to Sue the Corporation He Works
For So Long As He Provides Notice to the Corporation of His Intentions
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that a director of a corporation is not
precluded from bringing suit merely because he is a director in the corporation.
The Court of Chancery of Delaware added a safeguard to this rule in Henshaw v.
American Cement Corp.,7" where the court held that a director was permitted to
bring suit against the corporation he worked for and did not give up his right to
inspection of the corporation's books because of this.76 The court noted that de-
spite this right, the director could not give his attorneys the right to inspect the
books, as an ordinary plaintiff could do, because of his role as a corporate
director.
In recent cases, courts in both Delaware and Maryland have upheld these no-
tions.7" Specifically, in 2007 in Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc. ,7 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland allowed a former chief technology officer to sue the
corporation for his nonrenewal benefits as provided in his contract without
breaching his fiduciary duties to that corporation."0
69. An interested director transaction falling within the statutory safe harbor can still be challenged, how-
ever, on other grounds, such as waste or lack of an informed decision. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 65, at 270.
70. 764 A.2d 270 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
71. Id. at 277.
72. id.
73. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AS'NS § 2-419(b)(2)).
74. Id. at 277.
75. 252 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1969).
76. id.
77. Id. The court noted that this would give the director an "unfair advantage." Id.
78. See, e.g., Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc., No. 1395-N, 2006 WL 985361, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5,
2006); Radiancy, Inc. v. Azar, No. 1547-N, 2006 WL 224059, at '3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006).
79. 923 A.2d 1032 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
80. Id. at 1047-56. The appellate court also ultimately held that the former director did not breach his
fiduciary duties to the corporation because his conduct did not rise to the level of gross misconduct required to
sustain such a claim. Id.
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Several courts have also found that when suing a corporation, a director must
provide ample notice to the board of directors about the possibility of such a law-
suit. In Neukom v. North Butte Mining Co., ' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that a director has the same rights as any creditor in his
ability to sue a corporation, but in order to appropriately exercise this right, he
must make full disclosure of all of the circumstances surrounding his claim and
provide ample notice to the corporation of his intentions to act as a creditor. 2
D. Fiduciary Duty Principles Enable a Director to Attach Corporate Assets to a
Judgment Against a Corporation As Long As The Director is Acting
in Good Faith
Other jurisdictions have adopted various rules about a director's ability to include a
pre-judgment writ of attachment for the corporation's assets in his lawsuit against
the corporation. In Marr v. Marr,3 the New Jersey appellate court found that a
director may bring an action against a corporation and enforce the judgment so
long as he does so "not covertly, but openly, and with fair notice to his company."84
In Marr, the corporation's director filed a lawsuit against the corporation and ob-
tained judgment on the debt, causing the corporation's assets to be sold at a sher-
iff's sale. 5 This occurred without notice of the attachment to the shareholders or
directors.8 6 The court found that without such notice of his intentions, the director
had breached his fiduciary duty because he had offered no proof that his actions
were consistent with the best interests of the stockholders. 7
Additionally, in Union Ice Co. v. Hulton,8 the Pennsylvania District Court held
that a director or officer may use the typical means that an outside creditor would
have to enforce a judgment against the corporation, but he may not take unfair
advantage of the situation because of his position. 9 In that case, the president of a
corporation made loans to the corporation and when they went unpaid, he
brought suit against the corporation, causing the corporation's assets to be sold at a
sheriffs sale, and then the president repurchased the assets at a low price.9" The
court held that the president ordinarily had a right to attach the corporation's
assets but he had taken advantage of the situation because of his knowledge and his
position and so he lost that right.9
81. 84 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1934).
82. Id. at 104.
83. 70 A. 375 (N.J. 1908).
84. Id. at 378.
85. Id. at 376-79.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 378-80.
88. 140 A. 514 (Pa. 1928).
89. Id. at 514-15.
90. Id. at 514.
91. Id. at 515. The court also noted that the president had not given proper notice of the impending
attachment, which the court found was integral to a director's acting in good faith. Id.
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III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland," the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and held that when a corpora-
tion's director sues the corporation as an aggrieved former employee and attaches
the corporation's assets to the judgment, he does not breach his fiduciary duties to
that corporation." Writing for the court, Justice Harrell began by explaining the
general fiduciary principles that guide all directors who serve on corporate
boards-these principles require that a director perform his duties in good faith, in
a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances.94 A director must act in the best interests of the corporation
and must always place the corporation's interests ahead of his own, as he cannot act
both for himself and the corporation." However, the court noted that there are
occasions when a corporate director may proceed with an individual plan of action
even though his interests conflict with those of the corporation and, in some cases,
the corporation can actually secure a benefit from a director operating under a
conflict." Storetrax argued that Gurland operated under such a conflict of interest
and thus breached his fiduciary duty not necessarily by filing the lawsuit but by
failing to inform Storetrax of the lawsuit when he knew they had no knowledge of
it." Storetrax further argued that when there was no response from the corpora-
tion, Gurland should have realized that the corporation did not have notice of the
lawsuit and by pursuing summary judgment by default, he had placed his interests
ahead of the corporation." The court noted that while Gurland's lawsuit was an
obvious conflict of interest,99 Maryland law did not require the transaction to be
automatically void, but instead should be subjected to close scrutiny.' ° The court
92. 915 A.2d 991 (Md. 2007).
93. Id. at 1010. The court noted that the internal affairs doctrine probably required that the court apply
Delaware law, the law in the state where Storetrax was incorporated, to the case. Id. at 999-1000 (citing Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); NAACP v. Golding, 679 A.2d 554, 559 (Md. 1996)). However, the
court also affirmed the intermediate appellate court's decision that there is no discernable difference between
the corporate and fiduciary laws of Maryland and Delaware, and thus held that it did not matter which law is
applied. Id. at 1000. The court went on to apply the rules and principles of corporate law in Maryland. Id.
94. Id. at 1000-01.
95. Id. at 1001 (citing Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 436-37 (1881); Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Ab-
bott, 74 A.2d 17, 20 (Md. 1950)).
96. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 1001 ("An interest conflict is not in itself a crime or a tort or necessarily injuri-
ous to others and in many situations, the corporation and the shareholders may secure major benefits from a
transaction despite the presence of a director's conflicting interest." (citing Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270,
277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000))).
97. Id. at 1002.
98. Id.
99. Gurland was operating under a conflict of interest because his personal interests in obtaining his
severance payout were adverse to those of the corporation because "threatened or actual litigation is adversarial
in nature." Id. at 1004. Gurland's seeking $150,000 in payment was "clearly not in the corporation's best
interests." Id.
100. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 2-419(a)-(b)).
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then explained that a director operating under such a conflict may find a safe har-
bor by disclosing the conflict of interest to the corporation and giving the board
notice so that a majority of the remaining disinterested shareholders may approve
the transaction or otherwise take action to protect the corporation.'' In this case,
providing such notice would "strike the proper balance" between Gurland's legal
right to seek his severance payout while also requiring him to fulfill his fiduciary
obligations to the corporation.0 2 Here, the court reasoned that Gurland had suffi-
ciently notified the corporation of the imminence of a lawsuit such that he could
seek the protections of the safe harbor because his December 11, 2001, letter specif-
ically said if the matter was not resolved within ten days that he would inform his
attorney to proceed with litigation.0 3 The court further noted that Storetrax's re-
sponse to Gurland's letter said that the corporation had engaged counsel and was
prepared to defend itself-further indication that it had notice of potential litiga-
tion and was preparing for litigation itself.'0 4 The court also found that Gurland
had not used any insider information to conceal the pending lawsuit or prevent
Storetrax from receiving notice.' 5 To the contrary, the court noted there was noth-
ing in the record to support the assumption that Gurland knew the corporation did
not have notice of the actual lawsuit filing.'0 6
The court next addressed whether Gurland had breached his fiduciary duty by
attaching the corporation's assets to enforce the summary judgment by default and
by failing to voluntarily relinquish the writ at the corporation's request.0 7 The
court noted it was a case of first impression in Maryland, but that most jurisdic-
tions permit corporate directors to become creditors of his or her corporation in
the absence of bad faith or fraud.' The director then has the same rights as any
other creditor would have to enforce a judgment against the corporation and his
rights are as extensive as any other creditors' would be.' 9 For these reasons, the
101. Id. at 1002-03 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 2-405.1 (stating the Maryland rules gov-
erning interested director transactions and permitting a safe harbor for director disclosure); Shapiro v. Green-
field, 764 A.2d 270, 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)). The court explained that "[a]lthough the analogy is by no
means perfect, applying to the present case a requirement that the director notify the corporation of his inten-
tion to file a lawsuit against the corporation allows the director to assert his or her legal rights against the
corporation while giving the corporation, at the same time, the opportunity to act in defense of its own
interests." Id. at 1003-04.
102. Id. at 1004.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1004-05.
105. Id. at 1005.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Beaver Park Co. v. Hobson, 283 P. 772, 775-76 (Colo. 1930)). The court further noted that
it could not find any general rule forbidding a director from becoming a creditor of his or her corporation or
preventing the director from enforcing claims made against the corporation. Id. at 1005.
109. Id. at 1004.
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court found that Gurland had not breached his fiduciary duties simply by attaching
the corporation's assets and failing to notify the corporation of his intentions.'
The court then addressed Storetrax's arguments that two cases supported the
proposition that Gurland should have given the corporation actual notice before
filing the lawsuit and attaching the corporation's assets."' The court first discussed
Marr v. Marr,"2 in which the New Jersey appellate court found that a director may
bring an action against the corporation and proceed to judgment so long as he
does so openly and with fair notice to the company."3 Next, the court looked at
Union Ice Co. v. Hulton,"" where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that
vague and indefinite notice indicating only that there was a possible future inten-
tion to attach a corporation's assets was not sufficient to constitute the notice re-
quired."5 In analyzing both of these cases, the court found them distinguishable
because of the factual circumstances regarding the quality and definiteness of Gur-
land's notice to Storetrax. ll6 In Marr, the director only gave oral notice at a share-
holder's meeting that he would file a lawsuit sometime in the future but no specific
deadline was given, whereas in this case, the court explained, Gurland gave a spe-
cific deadline and indicated that litigation was imminent.1 7 Similarly, in Union Ice,
the court noted that the notice did not establish any time frame and only informed
the corporation that the claims would "eventually" be reduced to a judgment."'
Again, the court noted the detail of Gurland's letters which it found provided am-
ple notice." 9 Because of these factual distinctions, the court rejected Storetrax's
argument and found Gurland's notice sufficient and specific. 2 °
Finally, the court explained that Gurland's refusal to lift the garnishment or vol-
untarily set aside the judgment was not a breach of his fiduciary duty. 2' The court
found that Maryland law has recognized that the fiduciary relationship between the
director and the corporation is not enough to impose a legal obligation on the
director to accede to the corporation's demands when they are adverse to the direc-
tor's personal financial interest.'22 The court reasoned that to permit the rule that a
director violates his fiduciary duty to the corporation merely because he fails to
relinquish a legal interest at the corporation's request would mean that a corpora-
110. Id. at 1006.
111. Id.
112. 70 A. 375 (N.J. 1908). For a discussion of Marr, see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
113. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 1007 (citing Mart, 70 A. at 378).
114. 140 A. 514 (Pa. 1928). For a discussion of Union Ice, see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
115. Storetrax, 915 A.2d at 1008 (citing Union Ice, 140 A. at 514-15).
116. id.
117. Id. Additionally, Storetrax engaged counsel and responded to the letter-further indication that they
were prepared for the lawsuit. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1008-09.
121. id. at 1009-10.
122. Id. at 1010 (citing Waterfall Sys., Inc. v. Craig, 914 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1995)).
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tion could prohibit any director from suing the corporation because he would be
obligated to cease pursuing his legal rights at the corporation's request. 2 '
IV. ANALYSIS
In Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland,'24 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
director who sues the corporation of which he is a board member and then at-
taches the corporation's assets without notice does not breach his fiduciary duties
to the corporation.2 ' In so holding, the appellate court failed to consider both the
policy behind the fiduciary rules and the well-established precedent governing con-
flict of interest dealings between a director and the corporation he works for.'26 By
failing to use a more fact-specific inquiry that enables the courts to look at the
circumstances of each case, the appellate court fashioned a rigid rule that could
result in undesirable public policy consequences by abandoning the specific pur-
pose of the fiduciary rules-to ensure that directors are acting in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders.'27 The court could have reached the same
conclusion using the well-established fiduciary duty and conflict of interest princi-
ples, allowing a more flexible standard that would enable courts to appropriately
consider the interests of corporations and their shareholders in the future.2 '
A. The Maryland Court of Appeals Failed to Consider the Rationale Behind the
Fiduciary Rules
Instead of creating a bright-line rule, the Storetrax Court should have considered
the possible policy implications of fashioning a rule that does not permit evalua-
tion of the factual circumstances of each situation. An underlying premise for the
imposition of fiduciary duties is a separation of legal control from beneficial own-
ership.'29 One of the earliest principles the Maryland courts recognized was that the
design of the fiduciary duty rules is to ensure that the corporation is operated in
the best interests of the business and not for the personal profit of one particular
person. 3 If one of a corporation's directors is permitted to place himself in a
position of personal gain or profit at the expense of the corporation, he obviously
cannot be acting to advance both his interests and those of the corporation he is
123. Id.
124. 915 A.2d 991.
125. See generally id. at 1005-10.
126. See supra Part II.A.-B.
127. See infra Part IV.A.
128. See infra Part W.B.
129. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (discussing the fiduciary duties that corporate directors of
Delaware corporations owe to their shareholders).
130. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 601 (1875); see also Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md.
419, 428 (1881) (explaining that the fiduciary duties applicable to directors are necessary because of the powers
the directors have over the corporation's affairs).
VOL. 4 NO. 1 2009
STORETRAX.COM, INC. V. GURLAND
supposed to serve. 3' The policy behind this rule is that if a director puts his own
interests ahead of the corporation's, not only do the stockholders and the corpora-
tion's creditors lose out, but the remaining directors are forced into the embarrass-
ing position of having to scrutinize and check the transactions of one of their
fellow board members.13 2 Moreover, as a corporate director, one of the key compo-
nents of the job is to choose the corporate interest over personal interest when the
job so requires. 3 3
Thus, the fiduciary duty rules are designed to protect two parties: shareholders
and the investing public who have placed their trust in the director as an agent of
the corporation, as well as the remaining directors, who would be placed in an
awkward and potentially disastrous position of having to closely scrutinize every
transaction involving the compromised director. These rules ensure that the inter-
ests of the corporation are always placed above the interests of the director.'34 By
eliminating this rationale from its consideration, the Maryland Court of Appeals
failed to consider the interests of both these groups.
B. The Maryland Court of Appeals Should Have Applied the Well-Established
Fact-Specific Inquiry Used to Evaluate Conflict of Interest Transactions
Stemming from the policy behind these fiduciary duties, Maryland courts have
adopted a well-developed and established body of case law on the fact-specific in-
quiry that governs conflict of interest transactions-one of the key signs of a
breach of fiduciary duty. 3 ' Allowing the courts to weigh in on the specific circum-
stances behind each transaction helps to create a balance between transactions
which should be voided because of the conflict of interest they present and those in
which the conflict might actually benefit shareholders. "' 6 It was the long-standing
common law rule that such transactions were automatically void.'37 However, as
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland noted in Sullivan v.
Easco Corp.'3 8 and the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Chesapeake Construc-
tion Corp. v. Rodman,'39 the law has since evolved and favored a more fact-specific
131. See, e.g., Cumberland Coal, 42 Md. at 605-06.
132. Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 261 A.2d 156, 157-58 (Md. 1970).
133. See Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1969).
134. See generally Cumberland Coal, 42 Md. 598.
135. See supra Part II.B (explaining the history and development of conflict of interest principles in Mary-
land, including the abandonment of the bright-line rule and the shift to a more factual inquiry).
136. See Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) ("[Ain interest conflict is not
in itself a crime or a tort or necessarily injurious to others, in many situations, the corporation and the share-
holders may secure major benefits from a transaction despite the presence of a director's conflicting interest.");
see also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 65, at 266-95.
137. See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117 (1863); Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cum-
berland Coal & Iron Co., 16 Md. 456 (1860).
138. 656 F. Supp. 531 (D. Md. 1987).
139. 261 A.2d 156 (Md. 1970).
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inquiry that takes each transaction's details into account.'" Under Maryland law
today, a transaction involving an interested director such as the one involving Gur-
land will always be closely scrutinized and, if shown to be unfair or entered into in
bad faith by the corporate director, nullified.' 4' Additionally, the burden of proving
that the contract is fair, adequate and equitable is upon the interested director.'42
This policy creates a system where a director is required to adhere to the utmost
good faith in his relation with the corporation, but can be excused in certain cir-
cumstances where his transgression would not have an adverse impact on the cor-
poration.143 Under such a rule, the transaction here might still be void, but Gurland
would have had the opportunity to defend and justify the transaction and explain
its possible benefits to the corporation.
Here, the Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted a rule that eliminates this
system and creates the possibility of directors abusing their positions of power to
act only in their personal interests.' This rule has the possibility of creating unin-
tended and far-reaching consequences for future disputes involving similar facts. In
Storetrax, there is no evidence that Gurland entered into any such transaction that
tainted his judgment to vote on corporate matters, nor is there any evidence that
Gurland concealed information to benefit himself. However, one can imagine
where such a situation could arise and create a rule that would not permit analysis
of the facts of such a situation severely undermines the purpose of the fiduciary
rules in ensuring that corporate directors act in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders. 4 In such a case, the court should be permitted to evaluate the
transaction in light of the particular facts, without being forced to rule that poten-
tially egregious behavior is not a breach of fiduciary duty.'46
Additionally, by not using a fact-specific inquiry, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has adopted a rule that runs contrary to prior established notice requirements in
the fiduciary duty context by permitting Gurland to attach the corporation's assets
without notice.'47 There is little doubt that Gurland had the right to file suit against
140. Sullivan, 656 F. Supp. at 533-35.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See generally Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 277-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
144. See, e.g., Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., 70 A. 95, 101 (Md. 1908) (noting the importance of not
weighing the transaction when a director is interested to ensure that the director's transgression was not fur-
thering his own interests at the expense of the corporation).
145. See, e.g., Union Ice Co. v. Hulton, 140 A. 514 (Pa. 1928) (finding that a corporation's director who
made loans in the corporation's name and, when the corporation defaulted, executed a sheriffs sale and re-
purchased the corporation's assets at less than market value had breached his fiduciary duty because he had
placed his own interests in financial gain ahead of the corporation's by not providing notice to the directors or
shareholders).
146. See Shapiro, 764 A.2d at 276 (discussing the rationale behind the evolution of the common-law rule
from a bright-line rule to a fact-specific inquiry).
147. Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 915 A.2d 991, 1006 (Md. 2007) (holding that "it was not a violation of
Gurland's fiduciary obligations as a director of Storetrax for him to garnish the corporation's bank account,
despite not informing the corporation in advance that he would be seeking garnishment").
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the corporation claiming his severance package. 4' However, the fact that Gurland
attached the corporation's assets while still sitting as a boardmember without pro-
viding any notice of the pending attachment is much more troubling. As adopted
by the Maryland legislature and as articulated by the courts in Maryland and other
jurisdictions, notice is an integral part of a conflict of interest transaction evalua-
tion. "'49 While Gurland provided adequate notice of an impending lawsuit, it is
questionable whether such notice was sufficient to put the corporation on notice
that he might attach corporate assets to such a suit and could drain corporate
assets, like in Marr v. Marr' and Union Ice Co. v. Hulton.'' Additionally, part of
this evaluation notes that a director may certainly use any ordinary methods to
attach a corporation's assets, but he must give notice and do so in a fair manner. s2
Without the requirement of notice, the entire purpose of the fiduciary duty rules is
lost because directors are no longer required to disclose potential conflicts to the
board of directors, thus making it easier for them to place their personal interests
ahead of the interests of the corporation-they never have to justify it to anyone.
By fashioning a rule that permits this, the Maryland Court of Appeals has created a
situation where shareholders and creditors are not adequately protected.'
V. CONCLUSION
In Storetrax.com v. Gurland 4 the Maryland Court of Appeals found that a director
of a corporation did not breach his fiduciary duty when he sued the corporation
and attached its assets to a default judgment without notice.' In so holding, the
appellate court departed from well-established precedent which permits a fact-spe-
cific inquiry whenever an interested director is involved. 6 By creating a bright-line
rule instead of considering the policy rationale behind the fiduciary rules, the Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals has expanded the breadth of power that a corporate direc-
148. See Hutchinson v. Phila. & G.S.S. Co., 216 F. 795, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1914) ("[Tjhere is no rule of law or
equity which prohibits a creditor of a corporation from bringing suit because he is also a director."); Weaver v.
ZeniMax Media, Inc., 923 A.2d 1032 (Md. 2007) (noting that while there is a duty of loyalty protecting share-
holders against self-interested directors, the director still has a right to assert claims against the corporation
without impinging upon the expectations of the shareholders in disinterested directors).
149. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-419(a), (b)(1) (West 2006) (statutory provision explaining that
if there is a conflict of interest with one of the directors, he can only seek the safe harbor and not have the
transaction voided by disclosing the interest to the board of directors and stockholders); see also 3 WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 907 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 2002) ("A director or other corporate officer may, in a proper case, become a creditor of the corpora-
tion . .. [but to] make a valid claim as a creditor against his or her corporation, a director must make full
disclosure of all circumstances surrounding the claim." (emphasis added) (citing Neukom v. North Butte Min.
Co., 84 F.2d 101, 104 (9th Cir. 1936))).
150. 70 A. 375 (N.J. 1908).
151. 140 A. 514 (Pa. 1928).
152. Neukom, 84 F.2d at 103.
153. See, e.g., Leavy v. Am. Fed. Say. Bank, 764 A.2d 366 (Md. 2000).
154. 915 A.2d 991 (Md. 2007).
155. See supra Part III.
156. See supra Part lI.B.
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tor has into an uneasy sphere."7 By not evaluating the situation under the
traditional conflict of interest principles, the rights of shareholders could be im-
pinged by this rule and the ramifications could be far-reaching and enable directors
to engage in personal dealings at the expense of Maryland corporations.'
157. See supra Part IV.A.
158. See supra Part IV.B.
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